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Abstract
Despite progress towards greater public engagement, questions about the optimal approach to access public preferences 
remain unanswered. We review two increasingly popular methods for engaging the public in healthcare priority-setting 
and determining their preferences; the Citizens’ Jury (CJ) and Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE). We discuss the 
theoretical framework from which each method is derived, its application in healthcare, and critique the information 
it can provide for decision-makers. We conclude that combining deliberation of an informed public via CJs and 
quantification of preferences using DCE methods, whilst it remains to be tested as an approach to engaging the public in 
priority-setting, could potentially achieve much richer information than the application of either method in isolation. 
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Background
Public participation can  inform decision-making about 
the distribution and delivery of healthcare, and can be 
especially valuable in relation to difficult decisions about 
priority-setting and resource allocation (1).  Despite progress 
towards greater public engagement (2), many questions 
remain about the optimal approach to adopt (3). The public 
engagement literature is diverse and spans many disciplines. 
Due to the influence of differing philosophical paradigms, 
distinct approaches and conceptualisations of engagement 
have emerged (4). While most engagement methods rely on 
qualitative approaches, a distinct body of work has emerged 
that is dominated by quantitative approaches and focused 
upon the measurement of public preferences. This paper 
conjectures that qualitative engagement approaches, and 
especially approaches that encourage deliberation, can be 
employed synergistically with quantitative preference-based 
methods to maximise the value of public input to health 
policy decision-making processes. 
Mechanisms for public engagement
High quality public engagement has been identified as 
comprising a number of salient characteristics including 
inclusivity, transparency, responsiveness, and authenticity 
(5). However, implementation of public engagement does 
not always achieve this ideal. Given the variable quality of 
public engagement activities in healthcare, it is not surprising 
to see an evolving interest in quantifying public and patient 
preferences to inform priority-setting (6–8). The potential 
for public preferences to inform decision-making is clear; 
decision-makers have indicated a desire to consider public 
views and the public have expressed a desire for their 
preferences to inform priority-setting decisions (9,10). Public 
preferences for health-related quality of life are already 
considered by policy-makers in some jurisdictions in so far as 
they are incorporated into  the comparative  benefits gained 
from healthcare interventions (via a cost-utility framework) 
(11). However, it has been recognised that patients and society 
gain social value from the way that healthcare is distributed 
beyond the health outcome achieved (12,13). Approaches to 
capturing this value and incorporating it within the evaluation 
of healthcare have been recognised as important but have not 
yet been realised in practice (8,14). 
There is a substantial literature on the array of methods 
available to engage the public in healthcare decision-making 
[(see for example (2,4,15)]. Ryan and colleagues provide a 
comprehensive systematic review and comparative assessment 
of the methods that can be used to elicit public preferences 
for healthcare (9), concluding that “there is no single, best 
method to gain public opinion”. Nevertheless, they do make 
recommendations around the appropriateness of selected 
qualitative and quantitative techniques. Two of their preferred 
methods, the Citizens’ Jury (CJ) and discrete choice methods, 
have been gaining prominence in the health literature in recent 
years [see for example (13,14,16–19)]. Each is associated with 
a number of features that make them particularly attractive 
for public engagement (Table 1), making them worthy of 
further consideration.
Citizens’ Juries
For many political theorists and philosophers, the greatest 
challenge for those seeking to extend and improve the practices 
of democratic politics has been how to transfer what worked 
in the relatively small scale of 5th century BC Athenian politics 
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to contemporary mass societies. Many of those practices are 
not able to meet the demands of larger populations. CJs offer 
a way of seeking informed public views using a democratic, 
deliberative process, while avoiding the problem of demands 
from large populations by limiting participation to a small 
number of people.
CJs combine a deliberative process with inclusion of diversity 
through random selection across a stratified sample (24). 
Fishkin argued that traditional measures of public opinion, 
such as polling, simply model the ignorance of the general 
public (25). When asked for their views on most matters of 
concern to policy-makers, uninformed members of the general 
public will offer their views and reveal their preferences, even 
if they know or care little about these matters.  Drawing on 
extensive survey data from the American electorate, Somin 
demonstrated the extent of this ignorance, which he describes 
not as a moral failing but as a rational response to the 
inability of individual citizens to influence large scale political 
outcomes (26).  CJs seek to address both these limitations, by 
educating participants through the deliberative process and 
by offering the prospect of a direct and tangible influence 
on policy decisions. Thus, this approach offers a potentially 
powerful contribution to modern policy-making. 
In a CJ, a small sample of the public is presented with a policy 
dilemma for deliberation. They review evidence about its 
nature and possible resolution, presented by experts who 
can be cross examined. The initial views of participants are 
potentially transformed by hearing the reasoning of others 
and through the requirement for each participant to justify 
their views. It is assumed that the deliberations of this sub-
sample of the population can be taken to fairly represent the 
conscience and intelligence of the general public (23,27). 
Allowing a purposive representation of the public to become 
more informed and then to deliberate about priorities for 
healthcare offers a potentially more reliable voice than 
opinion polls, surveys, focus groups or patient representative 
groups which are likely to present self-interested views and 
may reflect varying degrees of ignorance about the matter in 
question (28). There is evidence that jurors in these settings 
become more actively engaged in debates, express their 
views, are able to recall fine details about the information 
presented and, subsequently, develop a greater sense of 
coherence (16,18,23,27,29).
There have been a number of published applications of the 
CJ and related deliberative approaches in healthcare priority-
setting (16,18,29,30), some of which have been commissioned 
by health authorities. One of the most prominent examples 
is the routine use of a variant of CJs by the UK’s National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) for priority-
setting guidance (23). It could be argued that the NICE 
Citizens’ Council, which is essentially a standing body, is 
not really a model of a CJ, which is usually constituted to 
address a particular topic. The former is an institutionalised 
engagement model which over time could become part of 
the establishment itself, rather than an independent group 
of citizens (3). Nevertheless, NICE limit the term served 
by members of the Council to three years, which might 
counteract this tendency. The definition of a CJ in the literature 
is somewhat subjective, and does not deal with nuances of the 
method such as when a citizen becomes “institutionalised”. 
If the CJ method is to be scientifically acceptable, there will 
need to be some clarification defining the methodological 
boundaries of what constitutes a CJ. The UK is not the only 
jurisdiction to use this approach for public engagement in 
priority-setting, with interest in the approach in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (16,19,30,31). However, to our 
knowledge the UK is the only country so far to routinely 
embrace a CJ approach, rather than investigate their role 
through more ad hoc research projects.
What information do CJs provide for decision-makers?
CJs potentially promise a number of tangible benefits to policy 
and decision-makers. If implemented well with unbiased 
selection of participants, robust deliberation supported by 
mutual trust, and appropriate facilitation and expertise, CJs 
offer an opportunity to address the challenges facing those 
who seek to promote public participation in decision-making. 
Unlike many contemporary forms of public debate (especially 
those conducted online) that can degenerate rapidly 
into unpleasant exercises in abuse and ridicule, the more 
Table 1. Summary of the CJ and DCE approaches
Citizens’ Jury (CJ) Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)
Theoretical framework Theories of deliberative democracy Consumer welfare and random utility theories 
Approach Deliberative; output is from an informed sample. Stated preference survey; output is from a potentially uninformed sample.
Sampling strategy  
(selection, sample size) 
Random selection across a stratified sample to 
reflect the diversity of the population.
Optimum sample size unknown; generally 
between 12–24 (20); although up to 30 have been 
used (22,23).
Ideally a large, randomly selected sample, representative of the population.
Minimum sample size of 20 suggested for precision (21); but contentious. 
Ideally a larger sample.
Data and analysis
Qualitative. Jury discussions and interactions 
can be recorded, transcribed and analysed 
thematically. 
Quantitative. Choice observations are analysed using regression methods.
Output with 
information to be used 
for policy
Juror recommendations following deliberation. 
These may or may not be unanimous. Output 
does not capture strength of preference (without 
use of an additional method).
Captures relative strength of preference. Has the potential to derive 
preference weights. Trade-offs between desirable characteristics and 
willingness to pay can be estimated. Weights will represent the average 
preference across the sample. Has the potential to explore heterogeneity 
within the sample if a large sample is used.
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structured process of the CJ better guarantees the traditional 
Millsian right to free expression and an obligation to disagree 
respectfully (32). It is expected that the group of lay people 
who form a Jury will have different views and preferences, 
but the process of deliberation respects these differences 
whilst also striving for common ground. There is a belief that 
decisions made by a wider group of people (i.e. as in a CJ) are 
better in some way than those made by smaller, self-selecting 
groups of experts (33). It is assumed that the wider group 
is better placed to identify practical and logical flaws and 
provides a greater degree of political legitimacy to decisions. 
Despite these potential benefits, there are shortcomings 
associated with CJs, and their uptake into priority-setting 
has been variable. Methodological uncertainties associated 
with the CJ approach need addressing before it can become 
a method routinely relied on by decision-makers. These 
include the optimal number of people to participate in a CJ, 
how to select and recruit witnesses, and the extent to which 
the recommendations of the Jury are representative of broader 
public preferences. CJs are designed to deliver a consensus 
among the group and to achieve this in a descriptive way, but 
typically they do little to quantify preferences surrounding 
healthcare decisions. Thus, there is a need to capture the 
relative strength of preferences among the members of the 
group as well as their final consensus opinion. 
Discrete choice methods
Prominent among the approaches for quantifying public 
preferences for priority-setting are choice-based methods, 
such as the DCE (9,14,34). DCEs typically involve the 
presentation of a series of choices in which respondents are 
asked to choose one of two or more alternative scenarios, each 
representing a unique combination of specified attributes and 
levels of the treatment or service, under consideration (14,21). 
Statistical analysis of the individuals’ choices identifies 
the relative importance of the attributes and the trade-offs 
individuals make when choosing one scenario over another 
(i.e. the amount of one attribute they are prepared to forgo to 
gain more of another).
The DCE is grounded in random utility theory (35–37) 
which views the utility of a health program or priority-
setting alternative as consisting of a systematic or observable 
component and a random component that is not observed. 
DCEs also draw on Lancaster’s theory of consumer demand 
which views the utility of the program or alternative as 
being composed of the utility of each of its distinct parts 
or characteristics (38). Thus, the DCE method relies on 
some key assumptions, most notably that participants make 
decisions in such a way as to maximise their own utility 
(39). In measuring social preferences for priority-setting 
(40–42), the DCE method makes the implicit assumption 
that individuals are altruistic in their decision-making and 
that their preferences can be aggregated into a meaningful 
social whole. This presumes that for an individual, making 
choices so as to maximise the utility of society equates to 
the same decision rule as maximising their own utility. The 
firm theoretical basis in consumer welfare theories has led 
to the increasing popularity of the DCE method to assess 
preferences (14).
The DCE has become a popular instrument for quantifying 
healthcare preferences and its specific use in quantifying 
preferences related to priority-setting is also increasing (13, 
14,40–43). It has been used to measure preferences not only 
around the desirable characteristics of a healthcare service 
per se, but also around the distribution of healthcare within 
a population (44). It has also been used to assess preferences 
for the funding of healthcare, including the additional level of 
taxation people are willing to accept for a health or healthcare 
improvement (45,46). Although the uptake of the method by 
policy-makers is largely unknown, there have been prominent 
applications of the method to elicit social preferences backed 
by substantial public funding [e.g. the UK “Social Value of a 
QALY” project (47)].
What information do DCEs provide for decision-makers?
The DCE can be administered relatively easily to a large, 
randomly selected representative sample of the population 
(9). It is arguably a less resource intensive method of 
community engagement than many other approaches; 
although, resource and costs would likely be high for large 
sample sizes. It measures not only the direction of preferences 
around a topic (e.g. should health gain attributed to young 
children be weighted more highly than those attributed to 
older people?), but also the relative strength of preference for 
one alternative policy choice compared to another (e.g. how 
much extra weight should be attributed to young children), 
and the trade-offs that respondents would be willing to make 
between different characteristics of that choice.
The usefulness of most preference-based approaches 
(including DCEs) may be limited when the respondents 
represent what might be called a naïve sample of the general 
public, that is they lack personal knowledge or experience on 
the issue and, thus, little weight can be given to the results 
(9,48). This is exacerbated, since respondents to a DCE 
have generally not had the opportunity to deliberate an 
issue before their preferences are elicited. Indeed, there is 
some indication that deliberation might affect preferences 
(49), but the extent of the impact and, most importantly, 
the implications for decision-making have not been widely 
evaluated. Nevertheless, use of a general public sample who 
do not have specific experience of a particular issue may 
be helpful in avoiding the “veil of experience” (tendency to 
prefer that which is familiar) which has been reported when 
eliciting patient preferences (50). When eliciting preferences 
for priority setting (or indeed deliberating issues in a CJ), it is 
important to also consider the extent to which the individuals 
providing their preferences have had experience with the 
issue at hand.
  
The potential for a combined methods approach 
Studies on public input into priority-setting typically adopt 
either a qualitative or quantitative approach (9). There is 
clear potential for combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods to address priority-setting dilemmas. Some previous 
engagement methods, such as the Choosing Health Plans 
All Together (CHAT) methodology developed in the United 
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States (51,52), have combined qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to public participation. However, these 
approaches have generally reported descriptive measures of 
preference (e.g. proportion choosing a certain option) rather 
than relative strength of preference by eliciting preference 
weights for the characteristics of each option based on trade-
offs and opportunity cost. 
A mixed methods approach combining the CJ deliberative 
method and a method capable of weighting preferences for 
priority setting has not to date been trialled. This combined 
approach would potentially allow the in-depth deliberation 
of topical issues in healthcare priority-setting via the CJ 
approach, with quantification of the preferences of the Jurors 
via a DCE. Providing at least twenty jurors participate, 
this could provide both comprehensive guidance on the 
opinions and the relative strength of preference of informed 
jurors around a priority-setting topic.  Preferences could be 
measured before and after the CJ, to measure not only the 
strength of preferences around the issue, but also any impact 
that deliberation might have on preferences. Sampling theory 
does not provide clear guidance for DCE sample sizes that 
are required to give precise preference estimates; sample sizes 
are generally estimated according to rules of thumb, with a 
suggested minimum of 20 required to estimate a preference 
model (21). However, others consider a larger sample size is 
required (34,48), and most DCE studies have used samples 
greater than 20 participants (14). For a combined approach 
to be viable, the feasibility of estimating a DCE based on a 
sample of 20 participants (which is also close to the maximum 
sample that would be recommended to participate in a CJ), 
requires empirical confirmation.
One further potential benefit for the combined approach is 
the possibility that completion of a DCE before a CJ could 
allow jurors to become more familiar with the priority-
setting context and possible trade-offs that might be involved. 
Whether this phenomenon occurs, and if so whether it is 
beneficial to the quality and extent of engagement, would 
require further exploration. The same DCE could also be used 
to assess the preferences of a larger statistically representative 
but uninformed public sample on the same topic, enabling an 
assessment of representative views and the extent to which 
they differ from the views of the Jurors before they undertook 
their deliberations. Intuitively this combined approach might 
be expected to offer benefits over a single approach alone; 
however, empirical investigation is required to test the impact 
of a combined approach on decision-making processes and 
outcomes.
Conclusions
To encourage a greater and appropriate uptake of public 
engagement by health policy-makers, it is imperative that 
researchers address the methodological uncertainties 
outlined in this paper. Apathy and ignorance constitute two 
serious challenges for contemporary democratic politics. 
There is evidence of growing political disengagement among 
the citizens of many OECD countries and of increasing lack 
of trust in political leaders and representatives at all levels 
of government.  However, there is also evidence that some 
citizens are willing to participate in more thoughtful and 
intensive forms of political debate, especially if these are seen 
to make a tangible contribution to policy developments. CJs 
offer the prospect of just such an informed and thoughtful 
process, but they are necessarily limited to a small number of 
participants.  By using a combination of random and stratified 
selection techniques to engage a large sample of participants 
and by imposing the rigour of DCEs during the course of 
Juries with a statistically representative population sample 
alongside the Juries, the outcome of these deliberations has 
the potential to be more realistic (in policy terms) and more 
representative (in political terms). Empirical research on the 
feasibility and outcomes of this unique combination of CJs 
and DCEs would reveal whether or not these putative benefits 
are realised in practice.
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